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INTENT IN TORT LAW 
 
Keith N. Hylton∗ 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper, prepared for the 2009 Monsanto Lecture in Tort Jurisprudence, 
explains intent standards in tort law on the basis of the incentive effects of tort liability 
rules.  Intent rules serve a regulatory function by internalizing costs optimally.  The intent 
standard for battery internalizes costs in a manner that discourages socially harmful acts 
and at the same time avoids discouraging socially beneficial activity.  The intent standard 
for assault is more difficult to satisfy than that for battery because it is designed to provide 
a subsidy of a sort to the speech that is often intermixed with potentially threatening 
conduct.  In addition to the optimal internalization goal, transaction costs play a role in the 
specification of intent requirements. The subtle difference between the intent requirements 
for trespass and battery can be explained on the basis of transaction costs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Prosser’s Handbook of the Law of Torts says that intention in tort law  
is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm.  Rather it is an 
intent to bring about a result which will invade the interests of another in a 
way that the law will not sanction.1 
 
The problem with this description is that it is circular, at least if we view the statement as 
an attempt to set out in general terms the type of intent that must be established to hold a 
defendant liable in tort.  How do we know that someone has the intent necessary to find his 
conduct unlawful?  According to Prosser, we see if the actor intended to bring about an 
unlawful invasion; where the definition of such an invasion depends on the actor’s intent. 
In this article I will try to avoid the circularity problem in defining intent.  I will 
argue that intent standards in tort law are objective and serve important regulatory 
functions.  The intent standards can be explained on the basis of the incentive effects of 
tort liability rules.2  Intent standards are easier to understand if we work backwards from 
an understanding of the desired impact of the rules to the language of the rules themselves. 
 The core of my argument is that intent rules work primarily as pricing mechanisms 
that internalize costs optimally, in the sense that they induce potential tortfeasors to choose 
the option that is least costly to society.  The intent standard for battery discourages 
socially undesirable acts and at the same time avoids discouraging socially beneficial 
activity.  The intent standard for assault is more difficult to satisfy than that for battery, 
and because of this it encourages (or avoids discouraging) the speech that is often 
intermixed with potentially threatening conduct.  The intent standards for cases of 
economic predation (inducement of breach of contract, unfair competition) reflect the same 
                     
1 William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 31 (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 4th 
ed. 1971). 
2 This paper’s focus on incentives and regulatory function can be contrasted with non-
economic theories of intention in tort law, see Peter Cane, Mens Rea in Tort Law, 20, 
Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 533-556 (2000); Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 
B. U. L. Rev. 463 (1992); John Finnis, Intention in Tort Law, in David G. Owen, ed., 
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford University Press, 1995), 229-246. 
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effort to discourage socially harmful acts without deterring desirable activity.  In addition 
to the optimal internalization goal, transaction costs play a role in the specification of 
intent requirements.  The subtle difference between the intent requirements for trespass 
and battery can be explained on the basis of transaction costs. 
 As a preliminary matter, I should note that internalization for its own sake is not a 
desirable goal for the law.3  Internalization is desirable because it discourages socially 
harmful conduct, or in other words contributes to the ideal level of deterrence.4  My 
argument would mean the same if one were to substitute “optimal deterrence” or “optimal 
regulation” in place of “optimal internalization” wherever the words occur below.  I focus 
on the word internalization because that is the easiest way to think about the immediate 
effects of intent rules. 
 
2. Intentional Torts: Review of the Literature 
 
Theories of intent in tort law are either subjectivist or objectivist.  The subjectivist 
                     
3 I especially want to distinguish the approach taken here from one version of the 
corrective justice approach, that of Jules Coleman.  Coleman's view of corrective justice is 
that it requires nothing more than the annulment of unjust gains and losses. See Jules L 
Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 Indiana L. J. 349, 357 
(1992). While it might be unfair to describe this approach as internalization for its own 
sake, it lacks a functional basis for the internalization goal.  The basis for internalization in 
Coleman’s theory is the Aristotelian premise that unjust impositions should be cancelled.  
Since only unjust impositions are to be cancelled (not all impositions) it follows that the 
core problem in Coleman’s theory is determining the meaning of justice. 
4 The ideal or optimal level of deterrence is assumed to be determined by the familiar Hand 
Formula (or Learned Hand analysis), evaluated with complete accuracy.  Under the Hand 
Formula, forbearance on the part of the injurer is socially desirable whenever the burden of 
forbearance is less than the loss that would otherwise be imposed on victims, see United 
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).  I will assume below that 
intentional torts do not confer a long run evolutionary benefit, as they may have in the 
distant past.  See Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (1963).  If intentional torts conferred a 
long run evolutionary benefit, then punishment would appear to be less desirable.  
However, whatever long run benefits were secured through the aggressive instinct, those 
benefits have probably tapered off quite substantially by now.  Treating the external 
evolutionary benefits of aggression as essentially zero probably would not be a serious 
error.  
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approaches, which have been explored more seriously in the criminal law than in the torts 
literature,5 appear to be grounded ultimately in Kantian theory.  Under the subjectivist 
approach to intentional torts, the law aims to punish tortfeasors for intentionally or at least 
knowingly violating norms that are implicit in the law.  Those norms, in turn, reflect the 
view that it is morally objectionable if an actor uses others as a means to his own ends, or 
fails to respect their autonomy.6  It follows that the actor’s true mental state is important in 
determining the appropriateness of liability. 
The objectivist approach, in contrast, views mental state as having a weak 
relevance at best to the appropriateness of punishment.  Legal standards are external to or 
exogenous with respect to the actor’s mental state.  The characterization of an actor’s 
mental state plays a role, if necessary, in designing an optimal regulatory system, but there 
is certainly no requirement under the objective approach to identify the true mental state of 
the actor as a primitive input in the process of determining liability. 
The objectivist literature in tort law begins with Holmes’s treatment of the legal 
standards governing intent in the first three chapters of The Common Law.7  The first 
chapter, on criminal law, examines intent standards for crimes.  Holmes argues that intent 
is reducible to knowledge of facts that would allow the average person to foresee the harm 
his actions will inflict on another. Thus, a criminal defendant could be found to have had 
                     
5 See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency & Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and 
the Criminal Law (1990); Michael S. Moore, Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action 
and its Implications for Criminal Law (1993). 
6 Richard Epstein, in his early period as a corrective justice proponent, argued that tort 
liability is presumptively strict because most torts involve an invasion (i.e., without 
consent) of autonomy.  See Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. Legal Studies 391 
(1975).  Charles Fried, a corrective justice proponent, took the view that liability should be 
presumptively based on negligence, because an effort to use others for your purposes 
inevitably necessitated an unfair extraction from a hypothetical aggregate social risk 
budget; see Charles Fried, An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social 
Choice 137 (1970).  Ernest Weinrib’s corrective justice theory is centered, like Fried’s, on 
the existence of an implicit social contract, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory 
of Negligence Law, in Justice, Rights, and Tort Law 123 (Michel D. Bayles & Bruce 
Chapman eds., 1983); Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 Val. U. L. Rev. 485 
(1989).  However, while Fried’s theory draws heavily on Rawls, Weinrib is more faithful 
to Kantian theory. 
7 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (1881). 
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intent to murder even though he did not really intend to kill.  For example, if an individual 
leaves an infant out in the cold alone without food, he could be deemed to have acted with 
intent to murder even though he may have sincerely hoped that someone would find and 
care for the infant.   
In addition to the objectivist definition of intent, which reduces it to knowledge of 
certain facts, the intent standard functions according to Holmes as an index of the 
probability of harm, in the sense that it allows courts to convict actors for otherwise 
innocent acts on the theory that those acts were likely to lead to immediate serious injury.  
For example, an actor can be convicted for attempted murder when the facts indicate an 
intent to follow through to the point of committing murder. 
Holmes’s second and third chapters, both on torts, continue with the argument that 
intent can be reduced to knowledge of facts that would allow the ordinary person to 
foresee the harm his actions could cause.  The intent standard necessary to trigger liability 
for trespass is especially low, or even trivial, Holmes suggests, because all that is 
necessary for liability is an act that interferes with someone else’s property rights.  And to 
refer to something as an act implies that it is done with intent.  One does not ordinarily 
refer to the involuntary contraction of muscles observed in a seizure as an act. 
 One important position from Holmes that I will adopt is that intent standards are 
objective, in the sense that they do not depend on what was actually in the mind of the 
defendant when he acted.  It is clear in the case of trespass that one can be found liable for 
it even though there was no intent to trespass.  The double-effect problem is a concern to 
subjectivist scholars, but has not had any impact on the law of intentional torts.8  The 
standard for assault requires intent to harm or to put someone in fear of immediate harm.  
This can also be satisfied by an actor who did not really intend to harm or to frighten 
                     
8 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in 
Tort: The Practical Craft of Restating Law, 54 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1133, 1140 (2001).  The 
double-effect problem arises when someone takes an action that may harm the victim but 
also may produce another effect, such as the brush-back pitch in baseball.  The pitcher may 
not want to harm the batter at all, but is aware that the batter might be injured as a result of 
this effort to prevent the batter from encroaching on the strike zone.  On the double-effect 
doctrine in criminal law, and some more general problems in intent theory, see Kimberly 
Ferzan, Beyond Intention, 29 Cardozo Law Review 1147 (2008).  
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anyone.  For example, if A points an unloaded gun at B, he could be held liable for assault 
even though he sincerely, though erroneously, believed that B knew that the gun was 
unloaded. 
 After Holmes, utilitarian analysis of intent standards would not appear in the 
literature again until Posner’s article on wounding to protect property and Epstein’s article 
on intentional harms.9  Posner’s article provided a cost-benefit (efficiency) justification for 
the law governing privileges to use deadly force to protect property.  Epstein’s article, in 
part a reaction to Posner, rejects any attempt to use cost-benefit analysis to understand the 
law on intentional torts.  Though Epstein’s approach, grounded in Kantian theory, is quite 
different from that taken here, his discussion is one of the first efforts to provide a rationale 
for the variation in intent standards observed in tort law.  Under Epstein’s analysis, a prima 
facie case for strict liability is established by the defendant’s unauthorized or 
nonconsensual touching of the plaintiff. 
 Posner returned to the intent question in an article with William Landes in 1981.10  
They used the Hand Formula’s comparison of the burden of precaution with avoided harms 
to explain why tort law imposes strict liability for intentional torts.  Under the Hand 
Formula, a failure to adopt a specific precaution is unreasonable if the burden of the 
precaution is less than the harms that would have been avoided by its adoption.  According 
to Landes and Posner, the burden of avoiding the harm is especially small in the case of 
intentional torts – in fact, negative, since the tortfeasor saves on effort by doing nothing 
rather than attempting to kill his neighbor.  Since the burden of precaution is extremely 
low (negative) and the likelihood of harm substantial, they argued that it follows that strict 
liability should apply as a general rule to intentional torts. 
 An important potential flaw in Landes and Posner’s reasoning was later exposed by 
Dorsey Ellis.11  When you choose not to take your neighbor’s property, Ellis suggested, the 
                     
9 Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 Journal of Law 
& Economics 201 (1971); Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 Journal of Legal 
Studies 391 (1975). 
10 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 
International Review of Law and Economics 127-154 (1981). 
11 An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts: A Comment, 3 International Review of Law 
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burden of precaution (forbearance) is not negative.  The burden of precaution is the 
disutility you experience by forgoing the taking.  If you had expected to enjoy great 
benefits as a result of expropriating your neighbor’s property then the burden of precaution 
is positive after all.  And if you expected unusually great benefits from the expropriation, 
say because his property is much more valuable in your hands than in his, then the burden 
of precaution may exceed the avoided losses.  Hence it does not follow immediately from 
the Hand Formula, according to Dorsey, that all intentional torts are instances of inefficient 
conduct. 
 Landes and Posner returned to the intentional torts question in their book The 
Economic Structure of Tort Law.12  Rather than refer to the burden of precaution, they say 
that liability for an intentional tort is implied by two factors: the likelihood of harm, and 
the burden of avoiding it.  Intent is inferred, according to Landes and Posner, when the 
probability of harm is very high or when the cost of avoiding the harm, for a given 
probability of occurring, is extremely low.  One clear case of intent is where the actor 
punches the victim in the nose; the probability of harm is high, and given that the actor 
must have been aware of it, we should infer intent.  The other case of intent involves a low 
probability of harm but also a very low cost of avoidance; for example, someone stands 
over a highway dropping bricks down toward the pavement.  If the traffic is sparse, his 
actual probability of hitting a car may be low.  On the other hand, since it was easy to 
avoid any harm to a driver in this setting, the actor should be said to have intended the 
harm if it occurs even though the probability was low.  
 Landes and Posner’s second description of their rationale for the intent standard, as 
a basis for strict liability, avoids Dorsey’s criticism and remains consistent with the Hand 
Formula as it has been applied by courts.13  However, as a theory of strict liability for 
intentional torts, it remains incomplete.  If a man suffering from starvation steals bread 
from his neighbor after the neighbor refuses to give it to him, he is still guilty of a trespass 
                                                                          
and Economics 45-57 (1983). 
12 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (1987). 
13 This is not the same as the perfectly accurate evaluation referred to in note 4, because it 
makes no attempt to take individual idiosyncratic features into account.  In other words, 
the Hand analysis is not quite the same thing as an unalloyed efficiency test. 
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even though the burden of avoiding the intentional tort is very high.14  Moreover, unlike 
Holmes, and unlike Epstein, Landes and Posner have made no effort to justify the different 
intent standards observed in tort law.  Their treatment of intentional torts makes no 
distinctions between the intent necessary to trigger liability under trespass, battery, and 
assault.   
 Landes and Posner’s approach might be seen as consistent with Holmes’s, since 
Holmes claimed that intent could almost always be reduced to knowledge of facts.  But the 
facts necessary to trigger liability differ among the various types of intentional tort.  For 
example, to be liable for trespass, one need only know that he is walking on land – there is 
no need for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant knew that he was on someone else’s 
land.  Assault, on the other hand, requires the defendant to know more facts to be liable.  
The defendant must know facts that would allow the ordinary person, if carrying out the 
same acts, to infer that his conduct would harm someone or put someone in immediate fear 
of harm. 
 Intent requirements vary in substance as well as form across intentional tort 
categories.  I will attempt to explain the variations in those requirements, starting with the 
minimal intent standard for trespass, and the close, though somewhat higher standard for 
battery.  I will then explain the standards for assault and other torts involving intent to 
harm.  However, before launching into these explanations, I will describe the levels of 
intent implied by the cases. 
 
3. Levels of Intent 
 
There are essentially four levels of intent in tort law. They can be arranged along a 
spectrum from involuntary conduct to acts carried out with the sole purpose of harming 
someone. 
 
                     
14 The theft-of-bread example cannot be treated, in an effort to rescue the Landes-Posner 
theory, as a case of high subjective disutility, where the objective social cost of avoidance 
is low (or negative).  In any moderately responsible accounting of objective costs, the cost 
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3.1. Involuntary 
 
The involuntary conduct category consists of acts that are not planned or controlled 
by the actor or injurer.  For example, a sudden seizure causes the injurer to punch the 
victim in the nose.  Or, the injurer is riding on a horse, the horse throws him, and he flies 
into the air and lands on the victim, or lands on the victim's property.  In these examples, 
the injury is not the result of some planned, intended, or controlled act.15  It is the result of 
a force, internal or external, which the injurer could not control. 
 
3.2. Primary Volitional 
 
Primary volitional conduct involves acts that are controlled by the actor, but in 
which the actor is not aware of or cannot foresee the immediate physical consequences of 
his action.16 
How could this happen?  Consider the battery context first.  One example is where 
the actor suffers from some form of insanity that makes him unaware of his immediate 
surroundings.17  Suppose, for example, he grabs the arm of a bystander, thinking he is 
actually in the process of opening a door.  In this case, the actor is aware of his own 
physical movements; he is aware and intends to be in the process of grabbing something 
                                                                          
of death from starvation would be incorporated.    
15 See, e.g., Smith v. Stone, 82 Eng. Rep. 533 (K.B. 1647)(defendant carried onto 
plaintiff’s property by others); Cordas v. Peerless Transportation Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 198 
(N.Y. city Ct. 1941)(defendant jumped out of cab to avoid armed robber, cab ran into 
plaintiff); Lobert v. Pack, 337 Pa. 103, 9 A. 2d 365 (1939)(defendant, asleep in back seat 
of car, kicked seat causing plaintiff to crash); see generally, Mark F. Grady, Cases and 
Materials on Torts 97-103 (1994).   
16 “Immediate physical consequences” should be distinguished from “incapacity to realize 
the probable consequences” used by Francis H. Bohlen in Liability in Tort of Infants and 
Insane Persons, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 9 (1924).  The “incapacity to realize probable 
consequences” description could apply to someone who understands the immediate 
physical consequences (physical contact) but not the likely result (injury). 
17 Fitzgerald v. Lawhorn, 29 Conn. Supp. 511, 294 A.2d 338 (1972) (defendant shoots 
plaintiff while suffering from insane delusion that the plaintiff was not a person and that 
plaintiff was assaulting him). 
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and moving it.  However, he is unable to determine accurately the object that is being 
affected by his action. 
Another example is that of a child too immature to know the immediate 
consequences of certain physical conditions.18  For example, the child is unaware of the 
laws of gravity, so does not know that he will fall from a table as he runs off the side of it.  
Or suppose the child pulls the chair away as a person is about to sit, but the child is too 
immature to foresee the immediate consequence that the victim will fall to the ground. 
Yet another example is the case of someone who yawns, stretching his hands out, 
unaware that his fist will hit a passerby.  If the actor is not aware of anyone near him,19 
then this falls within the primary volitional category as defined.  If the actor is aware that 
others are nearby and may be hit by his fist, then this is clearly a case of foreseeable harm 
and outside of the primary volitional category. 
In the trespass setting, primary volitional conduct involves a crossing of the 
boundary to someone’s property in which the actor is aware that he is walking but does so 
without an awareness of his physical surroundings.  Suppose, for example, the actor is 
sleep walking, or walking under some hypnotic trance.  The actor sees a completely 
different landscape from that which is really before him. 
 
3.3. Secondary Volitional 
 
Secondary volitional conduct involves actors who are aware of and can foresee the 
immediate physical consequences of their acts.  It will help to distinguish the battery and 
trespass cases. 
                     
18 See, e.g., Walter v. Kelly, 314 A. 2d 785 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1973), upholding trial court’s 
finding that although five-year-old girl threw rock that hit plaintiff’s forehead, she did not 
intend to strike plaintiff with rock.  Consider also Horton v. Reaves, 526 P.2d 304 (Colo. 
1974), where the defendants, three- and four-year-old children, apparently pushed a five-
week-old baby off of a bed, causing severe head injuries.  The court held that the 
defendants were not liable for battery. 
19 See, e.g., Moe v. Steenberg, 275 Minn. 448, 147 N.W.2d 587, 33 A.L.R.3d 311 (1966) 
(defendant skating backward, ran into plaintiff), discussed in Grady, supra note 15; Brown 
v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850) (defendant, walking backwards as he tried to separate 
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In the battery case, a secondary volitional actor knows that as he stretches his fist 
toward the victim's nose, it will come into contact with the victim.  If he knows this and 
nothing else, he is at the secondary volitional level, and this is so even if he cannot foresee 
that the contact will cause an injury such as a broken nose.  Vosburg v. Putney20 provides 
an example of a defendant whose intent was at the secondary volitional level.  When 
George Putney kicked Andrew Vosburg in the knee, he apparently did not intend or 
foresee any harm, especially not the severe damage later attributed to the kick by the 
plaintiff. 
Another example is the act of pulling a chair away as the victim is trying to sit in it. 
The secondary volitional actor knows the immediate physical consequence: the victim will 
fall.  Thus, in Garratt v. Dailey,21 the five-year boy who pulled the chair from under Ms. 
Garratt before she sat down probably understood that Ms. Garratt would suffer some 
contact with the ground.  It does not matter that he may not have foreseen that Ms. Garratt 
would fracture her hip.  It is sufficient for the secondary volitional intent level that the 
injurer was aware that there would be some possibly unpleasant physical contact. 
 In the trespass setting, secondary volitional conduct means being aware of the 
physical surroundings.  A secondary volitional actor need not know that he has crossed the 
boundary to another's property.  However, he is aware of his physical surroundings.   
Unlike the primary volitional, he sees what is really before him.  
 
3.4. Tertiary Volitional: foresight and intent 
 
An actor who meets the tertiary volitional level of intent foresees or intends the 
immediate harm or ultimate physical consequence of his actions.  This statement is 
obviously unclear, and needs to be fleshed out with examples. Consider the foresight case 
first.  In the battery context, a tertiary volitional actor foresees that his punch will harm the 
victim.  He does not necessarily foresee that his punch will lead through a complex chain 
                                                                          
fighting dogs, hit plaintiff in eye with stick). 
20 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891). 
21 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955); 304 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1956). 
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of events to some great loss, such as death.  However, he is aware of some plausible 
injuries that are likely to occur, such as a bruised face.  In the trespass context, a tertiary 
volitional actor is aware that he is crossing the boundary of another's property.  He knows 
that the property owner will regard his crossing as a trespass. 
 A more extreme case is where the tertiary volitional actor wants or intends to harm 
the victim.  For example, the actor foresees that his punch in the nose will lead to 
immediate physical injury to the victim and wants this to occur.  Or the actor pulls the 
chair away as the victim is about to sit, hoping to cause injury to the victim.  In the trespass 
context, a tertiary volitional actor may not only foresee that his actions will result in a 
trespass, but also aim to trespass on the victim's property.  For example, in Jacque v. 
Steenberg Homes,22 the defendant was warned against trespassing on the plaintiff’s 
property but did so anyway in order to reduce the costs of delivering a mobile home to a 
customer.23 
 
3.5. Implementation of intent standards 
 
In defining the terms primary volitional and secondary volitional, I implicitly 
assume that courts have no way of determining the thoughts inside someone’s head.  In 
every case, the level of intent is inferred from the facts.  If the facts are such that the 
average person would not have acted in the way the defendant did, knowing what the 
defendant must have known, unless he intended to harm the victim or at least was content 
with harming the victim as a step toward some other goal, then a court will infer intent to 
harm.  In this sense, all of the intent standards defined so far are assumed to be objective. 
 
                     
22 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). 
23 Jacque returns us to the distinction between subjectivist and objectivist inquiries.  To a 
subjectivist, it is important that the defendant in Jacque did not have a desire to harm the 
plaintiffs; he only wanted to save money by cutting across their property.  To the 
objectivist, this distinction is irrelevant because the defendant knew that the intentional 
(“in your face”) trespass was a direct byproduct of his decision to save money by cutting 
across the plaintiff’s property. 
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4. Explaining Intent Requirements 
 
When we say that liability for intentional torts is strict, the first question that must 
be answered is: what sort of intent?  If we regard intentional conduct as equivalent to 
voluntary conduct, then it is clear from the foregoing that liability is not strict for every 
intentional tort.  Strict liability applies only to those intentional torts that fall in the 
secondary and tertiary volitional categories. 
 In general, tort liability requires as a minimum the secondary volitional level of 
intent, which means knowledge or foresight of the immediate physical consequences of an 
act.  Actors who satisfy the secondary and tertiary volitional levels may be held liable for 
compensatory damages under tort law, and those who satisfy the tertiary level may be held 
liable in addition for punitive damages.  Criminal law, on the other hand, requires the 
highest intent level in order to punish.  The distinctions between intent levels can also be 
described in terms of the familiar labels “general intent” and “specific intent,” where 
secondary volitional describes cases of general intent, which is sufficient for tort liability, 
and tertiary volitional includes cases of specific intent, which is a requirement for criminal 
liability. 
 Among the standard intentional tort claims, the level of intent necessary to hold a 
defendant liable varies according to the type of claim.  Battery, trespass, and false 
imprisonment require awareness of immediate physical consequences – the secondary 
volitional level.24 Assault requires intent to harm or to put one in fear of harm, which 
implies the tertiary volitional level of intent.  The same holds for an “offensive battery,” of 
the sort that might subject the actor to punitive damages.25  Defamation and intentional 
                     
24 Recent developments in tort doctrine have not altered this long-standing feature of the 
case law; for a review with interesting observations on theory, see Kenneth W. Simons, A 
Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts? 49 Arizona L. Rev. 1061 (2006). 
25 Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872) (spitting in face); Draper v. Baker, 21 N.W. 527 
(Wis. 1884) (same); Jones v. Fisher, 166 N.W.2d 175 (Wis. 1969) (pulling out plaintiff’s 
dentures); Meadows v. Guptill, 568 F.Supp. 1362 (D. Arizona, 1993) (offensive sexual 
harassment and touching); Catlett v. Catlett, 388 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)(battery 
and false imprisonment). 
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infliction of emotional distress claims also require the highest level of intent.26 
 Why does tort law require awareness of immediate physical consequences as a 
minimum component of an intentional tort claim, and why do intent standards vary 
according to the type of intentional tort, and even within some categories of intentional 
tort (e.g., battery)?  I address these questions below. 
 
4.1 Secondary Volitional Conduct as a Minimum Requirement for Intentional Tort 
Liability: Trespass and Battery 
 
Awareness of immediate physical consequences, which I have described as 
secondary volitional conduct, is necessary and in most cases sufficient for tort liability 
because the law of intentional torts serves primarily as a pricing mechanism, or collection 
of pricing rules, that internalizes costs optimally.  The basic intuition was described by 
Holmes in the context of trespass. 
 
When a man goes upon his neighbor’s land, thinking it his own, he intends 
the very act or consequence complained of.  He means to intermeddle with 
a certain thing in a certain way, and it is just that intended intermeddling for 
which he is sued… One who diminishes the value of property by intentional 
damage knows it belongs to somebody.  If he thinks it belongs to himself, 
he expects whatever harm he may do to come out of his own pocket.  It 
would be odd if he were to get rid of the burden by discovering that it 
belonged to his neighbor.27 
 
This passage suggests that cost internalization is the aim of the intent standard for 
trespass.  However, cost internalization is also arguably the goal of the negligence rule, yet 
in the case of negligence the law does not require awareness of immediate physical 
consequences.  The law requires foresight of harmful consequences.  What explains the 
different knowledge requirements under trespass and negligence? 
 The reason awareness of immediate physical consequences is necessary and 
                     
26 On defamation and intent, see Holmes, Common Law, supra note 7, at 138-40; on 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Prosser, supra note 1, at 49-62. 
27 Holmes, supra note 7, at 97. 
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generally sufficient for liability under the law of intentional torts, and not so under 
negligence law, is that the law triggers liability at the point at which you become aware, or 
should become aware, of the cost that your act will impose on someone.  In the case of 
intentional conduct, you are aware of the fact that a cost will be imposed on someone as 
long as you are aware of the immediate physical consequences of your act.  If you kick 
someone on the leg, you are aware that there is a potential cost that will be borne by the 
person kicked.  The only case where you would be unaware of that potential cost is when 
you are not aware of the fact that you are kicking a person.  Assuming you are aware that 
you are kicking a person, Holmes’s argument applies directly: if that person is yourself, 
you will bear the cost yourself; if that person is another individual, you should not escape 
the cost, if internalization is indeed the goal of the law, by discovering that fact. 
One might argue that the costs of intentional torts would be internalized just as well 
by a rule that triggers liability for battery at the primary volitional level, when the actor is 
in control of his physical motions though unaware of any immediate physical 
consequences.  For example, suppose the actor, for all he can see, is standing alone in the 
desert.  He yawns, stretching out his hand, and punches a sudden visitor in the nose.  In 
this case, his intent level satisfies the primary volitional standard but not the secondary 
volitional standard.  Since a rule triggering liability at the primary volitional level would 
clearly lead to liability in the secondary volitional level cases as well, all of the costs of 
intentional conduct would be internalized under it. 
While it is true that the costs of intentional conduct would be internalized under the 
primary volitional standard, those costs would not be internalized optimally.  A primary 
volitional actor has no reason to perceive that his action will impose a cost on anyone.  
Given this, liability would have no effect on his actions, other than to encourage him to 
stay inside his home alone.  Since such a general discouragement of activity would be 
undesirable, using the primary volitional level as the triggering point for liability under the 
law of intentional torts would not internalize costs optimally.  The same argument 
obviously applies if the law provided no exemption for involuntary conduct. 
The tertiary volitional standard would also fail to internalize costs optimally.  The 
reason is that under the tertiary volitional standard, the actor would not be held liable 
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unless the facts suggested that he was aware that he would harm or intended to harm the 
victim.  Under this rule, there would be a vast set of batteries and trespasses that would be 
excused from liability.  For example, the five-year-old boy in Garratt v. Dailey who pulled 
the chair from under Ms. Garratt could not be held liable under the tertiary volitional intent 
standard, because he was not aware that he would harm Ms. Garratt.  The same holds in 
the double-effect scenario: for example, an orange rolls out of a door onto the sidewalk and 
the injurer, in order to get the orange and worried that the victim would get it first, pushes 
the victim out of the way.  Similarly, the trespasser who digs up your property, thinking it 
his own, would avoid liability under the tertiary volitional standard.  Since it would be far 
cheaper to you to reduce the value of someone else’s property rather than your own, we 
should expect frequent “unintended” trespasses under this rule.  Many of them would 
reduce society’s wealth because the trespasser’s gain would be less than the loss 
imposed.28 
The upshot is that of the four potential intent standards identifiable in the case law 
– involuntary, primary volitional, secondary volitional, and tertiary volitional – the 
secondary volitional standard appears to be the only one capable of internalizing the costs 
of intentional torts such as battery and trespass in a manner that induces actors to choose 
the least costly option to society.  The secondary volitional standard regulates (or deters) 
optimally because it holds the injurer strictly liable for costs he imposes on others when he 
is aware of their imposition, and therefore leaves the injurer with an incentive to impose 
those costs only when his benefits exceed them.  The secondary volitional standard avoids 
over-internalization, or over-deterrence, by excusing the injurer from liability for the costs 
his acts impose on others when he is not (and has no reason to be) aware of their 
imposition, and thereby avoids general discouragement of benign activity. 
Now consider negligent conduct.  You are shooting your arrow at a target.  The 
immediate target of your action is not another individual.  However, an individual runs 
across the path of your arrow as you shoot.  By assumption, you were not aware when you 
                     
28 To be sure, the negligence rule would remain in the background to be used to against the 
injurer in these cases, but it would be a strange and unstable regime if the injurer had valid 
defenses against the obvious intentional tort, but could still be found liable on a negligence 
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shot the arrow that there would be an immediate physical consequence to another 
individual.  However, the question that arises in the negligence context is whether you 
should have foreseen the risk of a third party running across the path of your arrow. If so, 
then you should have foreseen that a cost would be imposed on a third party.  Negligence 
law allows you to avoid liability only under the condition that the burden of avoiding that 
harm to a third party was extremely high.  Of course, in this example, the burden is low 
(simply aim your arrow in a different direction or hold your fire) so foresight will be 
sufficient for liability. 
 My point in comparing negligent conduct to intentional conduct is not to reexamine 
the benefit-burden balancing of the Hand Formula.29  It is to show that foresight of harm, a 
more demanding knowledge requirement than “awareness of immediate physical 
consequences” is a necessary condition (though not always sufficient in view of the Hand 
Formula) for liability under negligence law.  The foresight of harm standard is more 
demanding because it requires the actor to know a more complicated set of facts about the 
circumstances surrounding his conduct.  This is not to say that the actor who foresees the 
harm is necessarily aware of the immediate physical consequences, he may not be.  An 
actor may be able to foresee the harm to a third party without being aware of the 
                                                                          
theory for the same conduct. 
29 However, my argument has implications for the interpretation of the Hand Formula.  
The argument implies that the Hand Formula can be broken into a two part analysis that 
begins with foresight, and then considers burden.  It often ends with foresight too.  The 
question of burden becomes relevant only when it is clear that the defendant foresaw or 
should have foreseen harm to a third party or to property.  The analysis often ends with 
foresight because plaintiffs bring negligence claims only in those cases where the burden 
of the proposed precaution is relatively small.  One implication of this argument is that 
there will be relatively few cases, in the sample of those reaching judgment, that actually 
examine the burden of precaution.  It follows that claims that the role of burden is 
exaggerated in the Learned Hand analysis are of questionable validity.  Weinrib, for 
example, has made this assertion, see Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 148-150 
(1995).   I find unpersuasive Weinrib’s claim that the English and Commonwealth 
approaches to negligence reveal a reluctance, in constrast to the American approach, to 
consider the burden of precaution.  The American and English approaches appear to be the 
same.  And the screening process that rational parties will implement in the litigation 
process will produce a sample of cases in which the burden of precaution is rarely 
considered.  
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immediate physical consequences of his act, as in the arrow shooter example just 
discussed. 
 This comparison between intentional and negligent conduct illustrates the 
connection between the theory presented here and Holmes’s theory of intent standards.  
Recall that Holmes said that intent reduces to knowledge of facts that would allow the 
typical person to foresee the harm resulting from his actions.  It follows from this, and 
Holmes demonstrated, that when the likelihood of harm is very high (approaching one), as 
in the case of an intentional tort, the requisite knowledge of facts (necessary to foresee 
harm) is correspondingly low.  When the likelihood of harm is not very high, the requisite 
knowledge of facts is correspondingly high, which applies to the case of negligence.  The 
argument presented here is consistent with Holmes.  The key innovation in this argument 
is the explanation for the intent standard. 
The foregoing account of the intent standard provides a way of reconciling the 
seemingly conflicting results in the battery cases involving children as defendants.30  In 
Vosburg v. Putney, George Putney was held liable to Andrew Vosburg for the 
unexpectedly severe harm attributed to his kick.  One lesson often drawn from Vosburg v. 
Putney is that intent to harm or foresight of harm is not a requirement for liability under 
battery doctrine.  However, in Horton v. Reaves, the infant defendants, three- and four-
year-old children, were not held liable for severe head injuries to a five-week old baby that 
they had rough-handled while the baby’s mother was away.31   These seemingly 
conflicting results can be reconciled under the view that liability for battery requires 
awareness on the part of the injurer that his act will impose a cost on someone (secondary 
volitional intent).  George Putney was almost twelve years old when he kicked Andrew 
Vosburg, old enough to know that a kick could harm someone.  The infant defendants in 
Horton v. Reaves, though aware of their own physical acts, were not aware of the potential 
harm to the baby. 
                     
30 See, e.g., Walter v. Kelly, 314 A. 2d 785 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1973); Horton v. Reaves, 526 
P.2d 304 (Colo. 1974); Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891). 
31 The apparent conflict between Vosburg v. Putney and Horton v. Reaves is noted in 
Grady, supra note 8, at 108. 
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4.2. Variation of Intent Standards within Class of Basic Intentional Torts: The Role 
of Transaction Costs 
 
I have argued so far that secondary volitional conduct, in the sense of being aware 
of the immediate physical consequences of one’s action, is a necessary condition for 
liability for intentional conduct.  The reason is that tort law functions as a pricing 
mechanism that internalizes costs optimally. The intent standard that serves this pricing 
role best in the intentional torts case is the secondary volitional level.  In this part, I will 
argue that transaction costs play a role in determining whether the secondary volitional 
requirement is a sufficient as well as necessary condition for liability. 
 Although secondary volitional conduct is generally necessary for liability in the 
intentional torts context, it is not always sufficient.  In general, the intent requirement is a 
little higher for battery than for trespass.  There is a well understood exception for liability 
in the case of a touching that is generally treated as a pleasantry.32  For example, if a law 
partner pats an associate on the back to congratulate the associate for her work, most 
people would regard that touching as a pleasantry.  If, by some bizarre chain of events, the 
associate’s shoulder fell off after the touch, the associate would have a difficult time 
prevailing on a battery claim because of the pleasantry exception.  In short, the secondary 
volitional standard is necessary for batteries, but not always sufficient. 
 I am aware of no such pleasantry exception in trespass law.  If A wanders over to 
B’s property and rearranges his flowers on the theory that the new arrangement will be 
more to B’s liking, A will be found guilty of trespass.  This is so even if A knows B’s 
preferences and is correct in his view that his arrangement will be preferred to B over the 
                     
32 E.g., Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905)(“[A]ny unlawful or unauthorized 
touching of the person of another, except it be in the spirit of pleasantry, constitutes assault 
and battery.”).  However, the pleasantry exception does not extend to the case in which the 
defendant acts against the objections of the plaintiff in order to do something that he thinks 
is best for the plaintiff.  See, e.g., Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, Inc. 14 
N. J. Super, 390, 82 A.2d 458 (1951) (defendant liable for battery when defendant, over 
objections of plaintiff, manipulated plaintiff’s broken arm with the intention of aligning it 
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old flower arrangement.  The level of intent required by trespass is just an intention to have 
the immediate physical consequence, which is to be on B’s land.  There is no requirement 
that A intend to hurt B in any way, and no exception for “pleasant trespasses.”  As a result, 
the secondary volitional requirement is both necessary and sufficient for trespass liability. 
 Why do we observe this subtle difference between the intent standards for trespass 
and battery?  The reason is transaction costs, which are higher in the battery than in the 
trespass context.  Think of what happens in the battery context.  Many batteries arise in the 
course of spontaneous social interaction.  The law partner walks over to the associate and 
pats him on the back.  B taps C on the shoulder to get his attention.  Although the conduct 
is intentional, there is no time for the actor to seek permission from the person acted on.  
To seek such permission in all cases would ground a good deal of social interaction to a 
halt. 
Trespasses to real property, in contrast, do not typically arise out of the context of 
spontaneous social interaction.  It is much easier, in general, than in the battery context for 
the actor to seek permission from the property owner before crossing the boundary.  
Nothing requires A to act immediately to rearrange the flowers on B’s property.  A can 
contact B first and seek permission. 
 Of course, trespass law makes exceptions in the cases where A had to act quickly 
with good reasons.  A ship owner who ties his boat to B’s dock in order to prevent it from 
being blown away in a storm does not have time to seek permission before using B’s 
property.  The law makes an exception by giving the ship owner a necessity defense to the 
trespass charge.33  The necessity argument typically arises in settings where transaction 
costs prevent negotiation from taking place before the actor uses another person’s 
property.  However, the exception provided by the necessity defense does not affect the 
liability of the actor who uses another person’s property.  The existence of a necessity 
defense does not absolve the actor from liability.34 
 Since the transaction costs of seeking permission are lower in the trespass than in 
                                                                          
correctly). 
33 Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908); Vincent v. Lake Erie, 109 Minn.456, 124 
N.W. 221 (1910).  
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the battery context, the intent standard is also lower in the trespass context.  The reason is 
that the law encourages potential trespassers to seek permission and, if necessary, bargain 
for access rather than invading someone’s property.  Overall social costs are lower if 
people seek consent and if necessary pay for access to private property, rather than invade 
and compel property owners to litigate in order to enforce their entitlements. 
 Even within the battery context, intent standards vary.  In Mohr v. Williams,35 a 
doctor was held liable for battery for operating on the patient’s left ear, when he had told 
the patient that he would operate on the right.  One could make the case that the doctor’s 
conduct should fall within the pleasantry exception for batteries.  The doctor’s decision 
took place under a high-transaction cost setting, since the patient had been anesthetized, 
and it was intended to leave the patient better off than she was before the operation.  That 
these arguments were insufficient to avoid liability for battery suggests that the triggering 
point for liability in medical intervention cases is lower than that for ordinary batteries.  
The secondary volitional standard – awareness of immediate physical consequences – is 
both necessary and sufficient for liability in the medical invasion case. 
 The transaction cost rationale serves as an adequate explanation for the relatively 
low intent standard for medical invasions.  In general, the costs of seeking permission for 
the precise invasion intended are low in the medical context.  The physician simply has to 
disclose his plans to the patient and seek consent.  Given the low cost of seeking consent, 
the intent standard sufficient for liability should also be low, as in the trespass setting.  
Setting the intent standard low gives doctors, as well as trespassers, incentives to bargain 
first rather than invade, or to use the market rather than take, which is a central goal of 
much of the common law.36 
 As in the trespass setting, there are events that justify medical invasions where the 
physician has not received consent.  The most common is the case of emergency, which 
                                                                          
34 Vincent v. Lake Erie, 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910). 
35 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905). 
36 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972); Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 Columbia L. Rev. 1193 (1985); Keith 
N. Hylton, Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once Again, 2 Review of Law & 
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traditionally required a risk of death or serious injury to justify the nonconsensual 
invasion. The emergency exception was expanded in Kennedy v. Parrot37 to allow a 
specific type of nonconsensual invasion, extensions of surgical operations within the area 
of the original incision, when the benefits of the operation clearly outweighed the costs of 
postponing it.  In both its traditional form and in the Kennedy v. Parrot version, the 
emergency defense involves a setting where transaction costs prevent the physician from 
gaining consent before the invasion.  The patient is typically under anesthesia already, and 
the physician discovers that some nonconsensual invasion is necessary in order to prevent 
a serious injury to the patient. 
 Although the transaction cost theory helps explain both the low intent standard for 
battery liability in the medical context, and the existence of the emergency defense, it also 
implies that the emergency defense should narrow in the present and future.  As medical 
technology progresses, the cost of gaining consent to all possible invasions connected to 
any planned surgery falls.  Physicians can use x-rays, magnetic resonance imaging, and 
ultrasound to see inside a patient’s body and obtain the information necessary to foresee all 
of the surgical procedures that might be desirable.  Since the costs of gaining consent to all 
foreseeable surgical procedures are falling, the courts should be less forgiving of 
nonconsensual invasions that are claimed by the physician to be justified under the 
emergency defense.38 
 
4.3. Tertiary Volitional Conduct as a Minimum Requirement of Tort Liability 
 
The tertiary volitional intent requirement – foresight of or intent to harm – applies 
                                                                          
Economics 137 (2006). 
37 90 S.E.2d 754 (N.C. 1956) (during appendectomy, physician discovered cysts on 
plaintiff’s left ovary, which he punctured without plaintiff’s consent.) 
38 However, there is a factor that operates to increase transaction costs, even as technology 
works to reduce uncertainty.  As medical technology permits physicians to better foresee 
all desirable surgical procedures, it also gives them the ability to foresee all of the possible 
problems and contingencies.  The result could be an “information overload” in which 
physicians find it prohibitively costly to both predict and explain all of the sequences of 
events that might arise during surgery. 
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to a broad class of intentional torts including assault, defamation, and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.  Foresight of harm or intent to harm is a necessary condition for 
liability within this class of torts.  This is a higher intent standard than that for trespass.  
For simplicity, I will focus on the standard for assault. 
 The reason that the intent standard for assault requires more in terms of knowledge 
and awareness than that for battery is to avoid over-internalization of costs (or, 
equivalently, over-regulation, or over-deterrence).  By over-internalization, I mean a level 
of internalization that over-deters or over-regulates the underlying activity by pushing it to 
a level such that the benefits forgone by constraining the activity exceed the costs avoided. 
 To see the argument, compare the standard for assault to the standard for battery.  
Recall that the assault standard requires intent to harm or to put one in fear of immediate 
harm.  Why not simply require the same intent level as battery – namely, the secondary 
volitional (or “awareness of immediate physical consequences”) standard? 
 Suppose the intent standard for assault were the same as that for battery.  The first 
difficulty is determining what it would mean to apply the secondary volitional standard to 
assault.  It would be unworkable if a court held that intent to have immediate physical 
consequences were satisfied by a person who stretches his arms out, unaware of anyone 
else in his presence, when the other person is put in fear of harm by that action.  At a 
minimum, the secondary volitional intent level requires some awareness of an effect on a 
third person. The only workable version of the secondary volitional standard in the context 
of assault would be one that finds the intent requirement satisfied when the defendant does 
an act that invades the plaintiff’s “zone of danger.”39  If we imagine a line drawn around 
the plaintiff beyond which he is safe from an immediate battery by the defendant, a 
defendant would invade that zone of danger by entering into that space in full awareness 
that the plaintiff perceives the invasion. 
                     
39 The zone-of-danger test has been developed in the context of claims for damages 
connected to the negligent infliction of emotional distress.  See Dulieu v. White & Sons, 
[1901] 2 K.B. 669; Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963).  
These cases permit the plaintiff to recover damages caused by the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress if the plaintiff was in the zone of danger, in the sense of being 
personally at risk of serious physical injury. 
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 Suppose, then, that the intent standard for assault required only an intenton to 
invade the plaintiff’s zone of danger, as just defined.  Under this standard, the plaintiff in 
Tuberville v. Savage40 probably would have been guilty of assault, which may have 
justified the defendant’s battery of the plaintiff.  The plaintiff put his hand on his sword 
and said to the defendant, “if it were not assize time, I would not take such language from 
you.”41  The court found that the plaintiff had not assaulted the defendant, so the defendant 
was held liable for his battery of the plaintiff. 
Although Tuberville supports the proposition that mere words are insufficient to 
constitute an assault, we have more than mere words in the case.  We also have the 
plaintiff putting his hand on his sword while speaking to the defendant.  If the plaintiff had 
been physically close enough to the defendant to strike him with the sword, the defendant 
may have felt threatened by the combination of words with a hand on the sword.  This 
presumably satisfies the invasion-of-personal-danger-zone standard hypothesized here.  
Under an intent standard that required proof that the defendant intended to invade the 
victim’s zone of personal danger, the plaintiff in Tuberville would have been guilty of 
assault. 
 The over-deterrence risk becomes clear once we see that a lower intent standard for 
assault – specifically, one approximating the secondary volitional level by triggering 
liability when the defendant violates the plaintiff’s zone of danger – probably would have 
led to a different result in Tuberville.  The plaintiff’s conduct in Tuberville is expressive.  
He wanted to emphasize his point that he found the defendant’s language insulting by 
saying that he should not tolerate it and at the same time putting his hand on his sword.  
The combination of emphatic speech and gestures that could be viewed as threatening is 
common in ordinary social interaction.  A rule that imposed liability on such conduct 
would chill a good deal of ordinary speech. 
 For example, many people have a habit of approaching the opposing party in the 
course of a heated argument, as if the physical closeness would force the opponent to 
shrink from his position.  This combination of speech and conduct is designed to get the 
                     
40 86 Eng. Rep. 684 (K.B. 1669). 
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attention of the other party, but it does so by making him think that there is at least a slight 
risk of an assault.  A colleague emphasizes his points in arguments at close range by 
putting his hand into the shape of a gun and aiming it at the target of his speech as he 
makes each of his points.  No one is fooled into thinking that he is about to be shot, but the 
technique does get the attention of the listener.  These examples involve – for better or for 
worse – common methods of argument that could result in liability under a low intent 
standard for assault. 
 It remains to explain why it would be undesirable to chill speech, though the point 
will be uncontroversial to most and the reason familiar from the literature.  Speech, as a 
form of information provision, is a public good.  As such, it delivers benefits that are non-
rivalrous, in the sense that they can be shared by many.  One standard result of economics 
is that non-rivalrous goods will tend to be underprovided in normal market conditions.  
The law can help to correct this market failure by adopting liability standards that steer 
clear of imposing costs on the provision of information.42  This is the economic case for 
adopting liability standards that avoid burdening speech. 
 Again, the function of liability is to set up a pricing mechanism that internalizes 
costs.  But there is a background reason for internalizing costs.  That reason is to generate 
activity that approximates what would result in an ideal market.  I have suggested so far 
that battery and assault differ in the sense that speech is a significant component of the 
activity that could give rise to assault charges.  Because speech is an important component 
of the activity, an intent rule that raises the triggering point for liability under assault 
higher than that for battery avoids over-deterrence of speech. 
 Now one could argue on the basis of the foregoing that since battery often has an 
expressive component, the tertiary volitional (intent to harm) standard should be applied to 
battery in order to avoid overinternalizing costs.  After all, war is simply politics carried 
out by other means.  I described assault as intermingled with speech, rather than 
expression, in order to avoid suggesting that the law should subsidize any conduct that can 
be described as expressive.  
                                                                          
41 Id. at 684. 
42 Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 262 (1981). 
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 The problem with the war-as-politics argument is that battery, if it can be described 
accurately as expression, is an extremely unproductive and costly form of it.  A person 
who says “I hate the New York Yankees,” communicates the idea to others more 
effectively than someone who beats up Yankees fans.  Battery, as a form of expression, is 
so much less effective and more costly than speech that arguments for subsidizing speech 
cannot be carried over to the case of expressive battery. 
 
4.3.1 Defamation and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
 
 The argument presented so far for applying the tertiary volitional (intent to harm) 
standard to assault applies also to the torts of defamation and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Both torts involve speech.  Defamation involves speech that damages 
the reputation of the victim.  Intentional infliction of emotional distress involves speech 
that harms the victim directly. In both cases, the intent to harm standard applies. 
 To be sure, there are differences in the way the intent-to-harm standard is described 
in the legal tests for defamation and for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  These 
differences seem to suggest that the standards differ from each other and that they perhaps 
should not be described as intent-to-harm tests.  Still, if one cuts to the core function of the 
standards in both cases, it appears fair to treat them as intent-to-harm standards. 
 Defamation, for example, has been described as a strict liability tort (e.g., Prosser), 
and by others as requiring proof of malice (e.g., Holmes).  The strict liability position 
asserts that the defendant is strictly liable for defamation, but has defenses available based 
on truth and privilege.43  The malice view asserts that the defendant is liable for 
defamation only if no defense based on privilege or truth can be successfully asserted, and 
in that case the defendant is deemed to have acted with malice.44 Both positions say the 
same thing about defamation, describing the glass as either half-empty or half-full. 
 Whether one describes defamation as a strict liability tort or one based on fault or 
malice is unimportant.  Under either description, the intent standard that triggers liability is 
                     
43 Prosser, supra note 1, at 772-774. 
44 Holmes, supra note 7, at 138-140.  
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the tertiary volitional (intent to harm) standard.  To see this, suppose it is established that 
the defendant has no credible defense based on truth or privilege.  The absence of a 
privilege means that there is no objective benefit deriving from the defendant’s defamatory 
statement to himself, the victim, or some third party.  The reasonable inference is that the 
defendant made his defamatory statement for the sole purpose of imposing a loss on the 
victim.  This is the kind of intent that the tertiary volitional standard requires. 
 Suppose a defendant in a defamation action does have a credible defense based on 
privilege.  That means that even though there was a substantial and foreseeable harm to the 
plaintiff, there was also a substantial benefit to someone.  For example, a prospective 
employer may have been warned about the plaintiff’s propensity to steal.  Since the 
defendant was aware of the cost imposed on the plaintiff, the defendant’s intent level 
satisfies the secondary volitional standard because he was aware that a cost would be 
imposed on someone.  Since defamation law holds that mere knowledge that a cost would 
be imposed on someone is insufficient for liability, it rejects the secondary volitional 
standard applied in the cases of battery and trespass. 
 Now consider intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The Restatement says 
that in addition to malice or intent to harm, the law requires extreme or outrageous 
conduct.45  But these additional requirements appear to be designed to provide an objective 
standard or barrier that prevents unusually sensitive or timid plaintiffs from flooding the 
courts with claims of emotional distress. The outrageousness requirement does not change 
the intent standard from the tertiary volitional level to some higher intent level.  It is 
merely an effort to make the standard administrable. 
 
4.3.2. Economic Harms 
 
This framework applies to the economic harm cases as well.  The tertiary volitional 
or intent-to-harm standard applies, in the sense that the actor will not be found liable 
                     
45 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1966) (One who by extreme and outrageous 
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to 
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such 
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unless the facts imply that the sole purpose for his acts was to harm the victim.  The reason 
the tertiary volitional standard applies is the same as in the case of assault: in order to 
avoid deterrence of socially beneficial activity. 
 Consider tort law’s treatment of economic predation.  The most common types of 
claims in this area are inducement of breach of contract, interference with prospective 
advantage, and unfair competition.  To illustrate the point that the tertiary volitional 
standard applies, I will consider two of the economic harm cases examined by Epstein in 
his study of intentional torts. 
 In Mogul Steamship Co.  v. McGregor Gow & Co.,46 the defendant shipowners 
formed a conspiracy for the purpose of gaining exclusive control over the shipping of tea 
from China to England.  The defendants offered a rebate on each shipment, which the 
customer would forfeit for the entire year if he shipped tea with a firm that was not a 
member of the cartel.  They also agreed that if any shipper outside of the cartel attempted 
to compete with them, they would drive the freight rate to a level that would make it 
unprofitable.  The plaintiff, one of the firms excluded from the cartel, claimed that the 
defendants had intentionally deprived him of his right to ship tea on the China-England 
route.  The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed because 
  
there was here no personal intention to do any other or greater harm than 
such as was necessarily involved in the desire to attract to defendants’ ships 
the entire tea freight of the ports, a portion of which would otherwise have 
fallen to the plaintiff’s share.47 
 
This was a zero sum game, in the sense that all of the trade would either go to the 
defendants, or some of the trade would go to the plaintiff.  The court’s conclusion suggests 
that the defendants would not be held liable as long as they were trying to ensure that they 
got all of the trade.  On the other hand, if they took actions that went beyond simply trying 
to garner all of the business, the court would have decided in favor of the plaintiff. 
 Mogul v. McGregor can be understood as establishing the tertiary volitional (intent 
                                                                          
bodily harm). 
46 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889), affirmed [1892] A.C. 25. 
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to harm) standard as a requirement for liability in economic predation cases.  The court 
clearly rejected the secondary volitional (knowledge of potential harm) standard, since its 
decision would allow the defendants to impose a cost on the plaintiff (losing his business) 
as long as it was a necessary byproduct of trying to gain as much business as they could.  
Mogul v. McGregor implies that defendants would be held liable for competitive conduct 
only if the facts suggest that the sole purpose of the conduct is to harm the plaintiff. 
 The intent to harm standard is the optimal standard for cases of predatory 
competitive conduct.  The reason is that a lower standard, specifically one triggering 
liability on the basis of knowledge of harm (secondary volitional), would risk imposing 
liability on every act of competition.  Competition, like speech, is activity that provides 
spillover benefits beyond the particular customer who happens to find an item at an 
unusually cheap price.  Competition pushes a commodity’s price toward marginal supply 
cost, which maximizes the difference between the social benefits of consumption and the 
resource costs of supply.  The intent standard adopted in Mogul v. McGregor provides a 
subsidy of a sort to competitive market activity. 
Keeble v. Hickeringill48 is an example in which the defendant was held liable for 
economic predation. The plaintiff used duck decoys to lure fowl to his land, to capture and 
sell.  The defendant turned the fowl away by shooting his gun, and was held liable. 
Under the hypothesis that the tertiary volitional standard is required for cases of 
economic predation, Keeble v. Hickeringill is easily reconciled with Mogul v. McGregor. 
In Mogul v. McGregor, the defendants’ interference with the plaintiff’s business was a 
necessary byproduct of their effort to secure all of the trade to themselves.  In Keeble v. 
Hickeringill, the defendant set out to destroy the plaintiff’s business; destruction was the 
sole purpose of his conduct. 
 
5. Economics Versus Consent as Explanations for Intentional Tort Doctrines 
 
As I noted before, Epstein’s consent-based analysis is the only piece in the law and 
                                                                          
47 23 Q.B.D. at 614. 
48 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B. 1706). 
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economics journals that looks closely at the intent standards articulated in tort law.  His 
analysis rejects economics as a way of understanding the law of intentional torts.  My 
effort has been to show that the economic approach can indeed be used to explain the 
intent standards of tort law at a high level of detail. 
 The consent-based approach seems to have a great deal of explanatory power when 
we first focus on the intent standard for battery.  Since the intent level required for liability 
under battery is only the secondary volitional level (awareness of contact), one could argue 
that liability for battery is based on lack of consent.  In other words, since intent to do 
harm is not a necessary condition for liability, one could argue that the essential feature 
triggering liability is failure to gain consent. 
 However, the consent-based approach does not seem to provide an explanation for 
the secondary volitional level as the necessary condition for liability for intentional torts.  
If lack of consent is the key reason for liability, then why not hold someone liable for 
battery even when they are unaware of the cost imposed on the victim?  Why should a 
person who stretches out his harm while yawning, and hits another person, be able to avoid 
liability for battery if consent is the key to understanding intentional tort doctrine?  If 
consent is at the source of the law on battery, why should a person who is thrown from his 
horse and lands on someone else be able to avoid liability?  Once these questions are 
answered, the consent theory then needs to explain why intent to harm (tertiary volitional) 
is the necessary condition for liability for assault.  
 In order for a theory based on consent to serve as an adequate rationale for 
intentional tort doctrine, it must be coupled with a theory of fundamental rights, which is 
part of Epstein’s analysis to be sure.  A theory of fundamental rights, however, forces us to 
inquire into the source of these rights, which has been controversial since Bentham.  In the 
end, there may very well be a good explanation for their source.  The economic approach 
has the advantage of providing an explanation for the rules while avoiding the 
controversial and daunting task of specifying a set of a priori fundamental rights. 
 
6. Conclusion 
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Economic analysis of law has expressed puzzlement at the intent rules in the law, 
beginning with Becker’s discussion of criminal law in 1968.49  Under the standard 
economic approach, which focuses on internalization of external costs, the actor’s intent 
would appear to be irrelevant.  External costs should be internalized, or shifted back to the 
source, whether or not the actor intended to externalize them. 
 This paper advances the literature by using economic reasoning to explain the legal 
rules governing intentional torts.  The main lesson is that if one’s goal is to internalize 
costs in an optimal manner, intent does matter.  The intent rules of tort law function as a 
pricing mechanism that ensures optimal regulation of injury-causing activity.  Optimal 
regulation avoids underdeterrence of harmful conduct, and overdeterrence of beneficial 
activities.  A careful look at the various intent levels identified in tort law suggests that the 
ones actually used by courts as necessary conditions for liability appear to perform better 
than available alternatives as regulatory devices. 
                     
49 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 
(1968). 
